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1. Introduction
Recall Coase’s (1960) classic attack on the Pigovian mindset of many post-
war, neo-classical economists. If, as Pigou proposed and followers promoted, 
a regulator could set an efficient Pigovian tax to remedy a negative externality 
between two disputing parties, Coase reasoned it must be only because the 
transaction costs to collect all the necessary information were either nil or 
very low. Otherwise, how could the regulator have gathered all the private 
details on the marginal benefits and marginal costs underlying these citizens’ 
preferences to set the tax accurately? But if transaction costs were so low, 
Coase argued that the citizens did not need the regulator to intervene with a 
new tax – rather they could resolve the problem themselves. The regulator 
could simply assign secure property rights to one party or the other, and the 
two citizens could then bargain – costlessly – until they found an efficient 
agreement. Coasean bargaining with secure property rights and zero 
transaction costs avoided the need for government interference in the price 
system. This is the Coase theorem.
If one looks at the Coase theorem from a Nash bargaining perspective,
however, we see that efficiency should be exactly the same regardless of whe-
ther unilateral property rights are secure or insecure. By property right inse-
curity, we mean a person who thinks he has secure individual or unilateral
property rights to a resource is at risk of relinquishing these individual rights to
the group as common property. One could interpret ‘‘insecurity’’ here as also
meaning ‘‘secure but differently allocated’’ property rights, e.g., joint property
rights. That said, a rational pair of bargainers who negotiate costlessly should
reach the efficient bargaining frontier – secure rights or otherwise. The only
ingredient that should differ is the final distribution of the total wealth.
Figure 1 illustrates. Suppose the regulator gives player A the secure uni-
lateral property rights. Point x represents A’s outside option, or threat point,
with these secure rights. Player A can exercise his outside option at any time,
thereby ending the bargain. Bargaining, however, can allow players A and B
to achieve a mutually advantageous deal. Assuming equal bargaining ability,
point y shows the efficient Nash–Coasean bargaining solution – A and B split
equally the additional wealth above the outside option, with A earning more
total wealth than B.
In contrast, point z is a new threat point when A’s unilateral property
rights are perfectly insecure, e.g., joint property rights. If player A chooses to
exercise his outside option, both parties go to court to determine the final
outcome. Point zz is the Nash–Coasean solution to the insecure property
problem, which is again on the efficient bargaining frontier. Assuming equal
bargaining power, players A and B should now share total wealth equally. So
we see that a Nash–Coase bargaining solution with secure (pt. x) or insecure
Figure 1. Efficient bargaining with and without secure property rights.
property rights (pt. y), or any combination of these two poles (the line
connecting pts. x and y) should be equally efficient in this zero transaction
cost world.
But Coase did not promoted a world of zero transaction costs; rather he
‘‘pushed the fiction of zero transaction costs reasoning to limit’’ (Williamson
1994). His Noble–prize winning work 23 years earlier on transaction costs
within the firm demonstrates that without doubt (Brunner 1992; also see
Coase 1936). What Coase said was, since a zero transaction costs world does
not exist, what we need to study was the world that does – the one with
transaction costs (Coase 1998). In our current context, the open question we
address is how transaction costs work with property right security to affect
bargaining efficiency. The answer is not a priori obvious given two competing
hypotheses: a backsliding argument which says security enhances efficiency
because it avoids a costly battle in court; and the non-cooperation counter-
argument which says security reduces efficiency because the cost of
non-cooperative behavior is relatively cheap.
Our results suggest the non-cooperation theory does a better job at orga-
nizing observed bargaining behavior in the lab. We see that Coasean bar-
gaining with transaction costs is more efficient when property rights are less
secure, not more secure. Bargaining efficiency increases as property right
security decreases. The reason is insecure rights increase the costs of
non-cooperative behavior. A property right holder who otherwise might want
to avoid transaction costs by taking his outside option nowmust bargain. And
while bargaining is costly, it is not as socially expensive as the alternative –
leaving potential wealth on the table by avoiding the bargain as is permitted
with secure property rights. We find that the net gains from bargaining with
transaction costs under insecure rights exceed the losses incurred fromproperty
owners choosing not to bargain at all. We cannot dismiss these results arising
from irrational bargainers – nearly all agreement were rationally self-interested
and people valued security more the less secure their rights, as predicted.
These results alter the nature of the Coase theorem. Before, the argument
was without transaction costs and weak property rights, a regulator makes
property rights more secure to increase the odds citizens will bargain to an
efficient outcome. Now we find with transaction costs and strong property
rights, a regulator could consider making property rights less secure to
increase the odds citizens will bargain to a more efficient outcome. Within
our frame of costly Coasean bargaining, less security drives people to the
bargain table, and consequently, to greater bargaining efficiency.
2. A Benchmark Model
We start by defining the benchmark model for rational Coasean bargaining
with and without secure property rights in four steps – (1) the bargaining
environment; (2) property rights security; (3) Nash bargaining solution; and
(4) the controller’s valuation of reducing the risk of insecure rights. First,
consider the basic bargaining environment. A Coasean bargain consists of
two players (A and B) negotiating over lottery tickets, aA and aB, defining the
likelihood of winning a large monetary payoff, Z. For simplicity, we nor-
malizing utility, u(Z) ¼ 1 and u(0) ¼ 0, such that player i’s expected utility
is defined by his or her final proportion of total lottery tickets.
All bargaining has some transaction costs, C ¼ cA þ cB; where
ci ¼ uooi þ uyyi þ uzziði ¼ A;BÞ represents a player’s costs defined by the
number of (a) offers, oi, (b) evaluation of offers, yi and (c) counter offers, zi,
times the per unit costs,u0,uy, and uz. Each player also has an initial
endowment of lottery tickets, kA and kB, to help cover transaction costs.
Therefore, the total number of lottery tickets is aT¼kA þ kB þ aA þ aB þ aH;
where (aH/aT) denotes the probability the house retains the larger payoff.
Here aH represents the lottery tickets on the bargaining table given the
property right security, i.e., the potential gains from bargaining. If aH ¼ 0; no
lottery are left on the bargaining table, and either player A or B will win the
payoff, Z – the house has zero chance to retain the payoff. If aH > 0; some
lottery tickets are left on the table and the house has a chance to keep Z.
Second, consider property right security. Assume player A is the controller
– the player with property rights such that he can unilaterally exercise his
unilateral outside option at any time during the negotiations, i.e., the con-
troller’s threat point. Given his initial endowment kA, let aoA þ kA denote the
controller’s probability of winning the large payoff, Z, when he exercises the
outside option. Let 0 £ q £ 1 represent the probability that his unilateral
property right is upheld when challenged. Secure property rights exist when
q ¼ 1:0 – no risks to unilateral rights; no unilateral rights exist when q ¼ 0;
and insecure unilateral rights arise when 0 < q < 1, i.e., there is a chance the
property rights are joint.
Secure property rights implies that the controller’s expected payoff from
unilaterally exercising his rights is the sum of his outside option and
endowment lottery tickets, a0A þ kA; whereas the non-controller’s expected
payoff is just her endowment, kB. But for the cases of no unilateral and
insecure rights, both players’ expected payoffs from the outside option are
derived from a non-cooperative contest (see Dixit 1987). Let xi represent
player i ’s observable and irreversible effort invested to win the property
rights. Assume both player have equal ability in the contest.
Using the standard contest–success function (see Dixit 1987; Tullock
1980), assume each player privately and independently selects his level of
effort to maximize his expected payoff, EPNi ;
Max
xi
xi
xi þ xj
a0i  xi þ ki; ði ¼ A, B; j ¼ A, B; i 6¼ jÞ: ð1Þ
For simplicity, assume the value of the outside options is identical, a0A ¼ a0B.
Solving (1) for the players’ best functions, the Nash equilibrium levels of
effort:
ðxNA; xNB Þ ¼
1
4
a0A;
1
4
a0A
 
;
Substitute the Nash equilibrium effort levels into a player’s expected payoffs
to determine the expected payoff from the contest:
EPi
N ¼ 1=4a
0
A
1=4a0A þ 1=4a0A
a0A  1=4a0A þ ki ¼ 1=4a0A þ ki: ði ¼ A;BÞ ð2Þ
Therefore, with property rights insecurity, the controller’s and non-control-
ler’s expected payoffs when the controller takes his insecure outside option
are:
EP0A ¼ qða0A þ kAÞ þ ð1 qÞEPNA ð3Þ
EP0B ¼ qkB þ ð1 qÞEPNB : ð4Þ
Third, we now define the Nash bargaining solution given the non-cooperative
threat points. In a Nash cooperative bargain, each player negotiates to realize
the gains from trade over the existing unilateral property right. The Nash
bargaining solution is the product of player A and B’s potential gains from
bargaining:
Max
aA
½aA  cA  EP0A þ kAÞðaB  cB  EP0B  kBÞ
s.t. aT ¼ kA þ kB þ aA þ aB þ aH:
ð5Þ
Assuming efficient bargaining (i.e., the house gives up all lottery tickets),
solving the first order conditions for Expression (5) yields the optimal
number of lottery tickets for player A:
aA ¼ a0A þ
aH
2
h i
 qþ # ð6Þ
where
q ¼ 2a
0
A þ aH þ kA þ kB  aT
2
 
ð1 qÞ  0;
represents the impact of insecure property rights on player A’s tickets
(q > 0; if q > 0; q ¼ 0; if q ¼ 1), and
# ¼ cA  cB
2
h i
shows the affect of transaction costs – players share these costs equally.
Expression (6) says player A receives his outside option plus half the
bargaining surplus, adjusted for insecure property rights and transaction costs.
Note if property rights are secure (q ¼ 0) and transaction costs are zero
(# ¼ 0), playerA earns the standardNash solution: his outside option plus half
the surplus. The optimal allocation for player B is aB ¼ aT ) aA ) [kA + kB ].
Player A, the controller, should always prefer bargaining to not bar-
gaining. Comparing expressions (3) and (6) shows [aA  EPoA > 0] for any
value of q, which implies the controller prefers bargaining to taking the
outside option regardless of the uncertainty associated with the outside op-
tion, q. Opting for the outside option becomes an attractive alternative only
when the transaction costs effect is too large. Player B, the non-controller,
also should prefer bargaining. Given expression (2) always exceeds the
endowment ki, EP
o
B reaches the maximum when q equals zero and
EPoB ¼ EPNB . While the non-controller’s expected payoff increases in insecu-
rity, with the greatest payoff arising with no rights, he should bargain because
he always benefits from an efficient agreement.
Finally, if unilateral property rights are valuable, the controller should be
willing to pay to reduce the risk of insecurity. Using expression (3), the
ex ante option price, WTPA, for secure property rights given the bilateral
lottery is determined by
a0A þ kA WTPA ¼ EP0A
which can then be rearranged and rewritten as
WTPA½ð3=4Þa0Að1 qÞ
The option price is inversely related to the likelihood of secure property
rights. A rational controller pays less as property rights become more secure,
i.e., if q ¼ 1, then WTPA ¼ 0.
Table I summarizes the efficiency Nash solution predications of the
benchmark model given our parameter set. We set total lottery tickets at
aT ¼ 200; outside option with secure property rights at aoA ¼ 120; endow-
ments at ki ¼ 10; potential gains from bargaining from secure rights at
aH ¼ 60; and transaction costs: offer uo ¼ 2; evaluate uy ¼ 1; and counter-
offer uz ¼ 1: We consider five levels of security, q ¼ ½1:0; 0:9; 0:75; 0:5; 0:0:
We see predicated Nash solutions range from a 150:30 split with secure
property rights to a 90:90 split with no rights. The predicated option prices of
the corresponding outside options range from 0 to 90 tickets.
In principle, rational bargainers should always find the efficient Nash
solution at the least transaction costs. In reality, however, these costs can
significantly reduce bargaining efficiency in the lab (see for example Rhoads
and Shogren 1999, 2003). The open question is how transaction costs and
property right security intertwine to affect efficiency. Consider two competing
hypotheses. The backsliding argument says security enhances efficiency. If
bargainers cannot agree to an efficient outcome given economic friction, a
secure outside option avoids a costly and unproductive conflict over who has
rights to the resource. The property owner simply exercises his outside option
and the only efficiency loss is the money left on the bargaining table. Insecure
rights, however, would trigger even greater waste as the parties would both
leave the money on the table and expend valuable resources fighting over the
rights, i.e., a rent seeking contest.
The cost-of-non-cooperation counterargument says security can cause
efficiency to fall. Secure property rights reduce the cost of non-cooperative
behavior, which therefore leads to less cooperation. The property owner who
 Table I. Parameters and 
predictions
A. Parameters
Total lottery tickets (aT) 200
Unilateral property
rights (aoA)
120
Player endowment (ki) 10
Potential gains from
trade (aH)
60
Transaction Costs:
Offer (uo) 2
Evaluate (uy) 1
Counter-offer (uz) 1
B. Predictions (Player A:
Player B)
Outcome of bargain
Probability of secure
property rights (q)
Predicted
Nash solution*
(in lottery tickets)
Expected
outside
option (in
lottery
tickets)
Predicted
controller’s
option price
(in lottery
tickets)
1.00 150:30 120:0 0
0.90 144:36 111:3 9
0.75 135:45 97.5:7.5 22.5
0.50 120:60 75:15 45
0.00 90:90 30:30 90
*Payoffs are for additional lottery tickets (ai) and does not incorporate endowment (ki) and
transaction costs (ci). Endowment is 10 lottery and minimum transaction costs is 3 lottery
tickets (2/1 split between the two parties depending on which player makes the initial offer).
worries about economic friction can avoid it all by taking his outside option,
again the efficiency loss is money left on the table. Whereas bargainers with
high costs of non-cooperation – money left and costly conflict over rights –
have a lot to lose when they disagree. They will work together to find the
cooperative outcome even with transaction costs. The odds they will find the
cooperative outcome are also increased because the rational and efficient
outcome is an equal split of resources – a natural focal point for any bar-
gaining pair as experimental evidence has shown repeatedly over the years.
We now consider which hypothesis holds under our experimental design.
3. Experimental Design
Our designed follows earlier Coasean bargaining experiments (e.g., Rhoads
and Shogren 1999, 2003; Shogren 1998). Forty-eight students were recruited
at the University of Wyoming to participate in one of four sessions. Each
session had 12 subjects participate in five rounds of bargaining. Upon
entering the lab, subjects were randomly assigned identification numbers used
in assigning bargaining pairs. Each subject was provided instructions to
follow as a monitor read them aloud. Subjects answered a set of questions to
help them understand the experiment. The monitor then reviewed the
answers to the questions and addressed any remaining questions.
Each bargain was a face-to-face, bilateral negotiation over lottery tickets
reflecting chances to win a $10 reward. Subjects had a different opponent in
each round, and all bargains had a monitor acting as the intermediary. No
verbal communication was allowed between players or pairs. A monitor sat
between each pair and all transactions were directed through the monitor.
Prior to each round of bargaining, the monitor endowed each subject with
10 lottery tickets to cover the transaction costs that arose from offers, uo ¼ 2,
evaluations uy ¼ 1, and counter-offers, uz ¼ 1. These per unit transaction
costs were consistent across sessions, but total costs were endogenous
determined by a bargaining pair.
Subjects could earn additional lottery tickets by bargaining over a lottery
distribution schedule, which presented six different lottery ticket totals dis-
tributions. Table II provides the five schedules used in our experiment. For a
bargain to reach an agreement, two contracts were required. First, the
number contract required bargaining pairs to agree on the number from the
lottery distribution schedule (1, 2,…, 6). This established the initial level and
distribution of lottery tickets for each person. Each schedule had one efficient
number which allocated 180 lottery tickets (e.g., #4 of Schedule 5 from Table
II) and five other inefficient numbers which allocated 140 tickets or less.
Second, the transfer contract reflected the agreed-upon reallocation of
tickets between the pair. For instance, suppose the pair choose #4, player A
starts with 80 tickets and player B has 100. The pair might agree to
redistribute the tickets, say B gives 10 tickets to A, such that both have 90
tickets. There was a 10-minute time limit for bargaining pairs to sign both
Table II. Experimental design: lottery schedules
Number A’s additional lottery tickets B’s additional
lottery tickets
Schedule 1
1 120 0
2 110 20
3 100 40
4 90 90
5 30 110
6 0 120
Schedule 2
1 120 0
2 110 30
3 100 80
4 50 90
5 30 100
6 0 120
Schedule 3
1 120 0
2 110 20
3 65 75
4 80 100
5 25 115
6 0 120
Schedule 4
1 120 0
2 115 25
3 95 85
4 45 95
5 25 105
6 0 120
Schedule 5
1 120 0
2 105 25
3 90 50
4 80 100
5 30 110
contracts. Subsequent bargains entailed different pairings of bargainers and
different lottery distribution schedules.
Before each bargain, a game of skill between the two bargainers deter-
mined which would be the controller. A matching card game attempted to
create a sense that the controller’s outside option was earned and not arbi-
trarily assigned. The controller could exercise his right to take his outside
option at any time by unilaterally choosing a number from the schedule,
without input from the non-controller. For example, from Schedule 5 in
Table II, player A as the controller could choose #1 at any time and earn 120
tickets; B would get no tickets.
We introduce property right insecurity by varying the level of certainty the
outside option will be realized if selected by the controller. We consider five
treatments of property right security, q ¼ [0.00, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90, and1.00].
Bargainers knew the odds of security before each round of bargaining. If
bargainers reach an agreement, the mutually agreed upon payoffs are real-
ized. If the controller unilaterally exercises his or her outside option, a ran-
dom draw determines whether the option’s payoffs are realized. If the
controller’s outside option is not enforced, bargainers realize payoffs that
correspond to disagreement or conflict (each receiving 1/4 of outside option –
30 tickets).
Table III provides an overview of the level of property right security in
each round for each session. A single level of property right security was pre-
determined for all subjects in the first, second and fifth bargains of each
session. Prior to the third and fifth rounds of bargaining, we elicited the value
of property right security with the demand-revealing, Vickrey fourth-price
auction (see Shogren et al. 1994; Vickrey 1961). The auction worked as fol-
lows. All 12 players submitted a sealed bid to buy secure property rights in an
upcoming bargain with insecure rights. Each bargaining pair then played the
game of skill to determine the controller in that pair. The monitor then
ranked from high to low the bids of the six controllers. The three controllers
with the highest bids paid the fourth-highest bid, and thereby secured
property rights in the next bargaining session (q ¼ 1.00). The other three
controllers paid nothing, and then bargained insecure property rights at a
level set by the treatment (q ¼ 0.50, 0.75, or 0.90).
4. Results
Result 1. Given transaction costs, bargaining efficiency is inversely related to
property right security. Relative to the no security baseline (q ¼ 0.0), results
suggest that efficiency decreases about 5 percent when security is 50 percent
certain, a 20 percent drop at 75 percent, nearly a 50 percent drop at 90
percent, and over a 50 percent drop with secure property rights.
We show this result by considering two measures of efficiency – reward (R)
and relative reward (RR). Reward efficiency captures the improvement in
actual gain as a percentage of the potential gain due to bargaining:
R ¼ aA þ aB  CA  CB  a
o
A
as:
where as equals 60 lottery tickets (¼180aoA) for secure property rights
(q ¼ 1), 66 tickets for q ¼ 0.90, 75 tickets for q ¼ 0.75, 90 tickets for q ¼ 0.50,
and 120 tickets for q ¼ 0.0 (see Table I). Reward efficiency is maximized at
R ¼ 1 when all possible surplus is gained from bargaining (aH ¼ 0) without
transaction costs (C ¼ 0). The presence of transaction cost forces reward
efficiency to be less than 1.00 because either (1) the outside option is taken to
avoid transaction costs (C ¼ 0) leaving the surplus of lottery tickets un-
claimed (aH > 0), or (2) the players arrive at an agreement that secures all
the surplus of lottery tickets (aH ¼ 0) incurring the minimum transaction
costs (C > 0).
We account for the efficiency loss from transaction costs by also consid-
ering a constrained efficiency measure of relative reward (RR):
RR ¼ 1 ðRCM RÞ
R
where RCM equals R evaluated at the cost-minimizing bargain. Relative
reward is maximized (RR ¼ 1) when all possible surplus of lottery tickets are
obtained (aH ¼ 0) while incurring the minimum transaction costs,
min-C ¼ 2 + 1, one offer/one evaluation and acceptance.1
Table IV summarizes the descriptive statistics, suggesting insecure prop-
erty rights have a strong inverse relationship with efficiency. With no
enforcement (q ¼ 0.0), parties captured all potential gains in every bargain
(aH ¼ 0) such that R ¼ 0.963 and RR ¼ 0.988. Efficiency decreased about 4
percent when property right security increased to q ¼ 0.5, in which 94.4
Table III. Experimental design: property rights security by and session
Session Round
1 2 3a 4 5a
1 0.5 1.0 0.5 or 1.0 0.0 0.0 or 1.0
2 0.0 1.0 0.0 or 1.0 0.5 0.5 or 1.0
3 0.75 1.0 0.75 or 1.0 0.9 0.9 or 1.0
4 0.9 1.0 0.9 or 1.0 0.75 0.75 or 1.0
a Indicates an auction preceded the bargaining round with the 6 of the 12 highest bidders
receiving certain property rights (q = 1.0) and the six lowest bidders receiving the indicated
level of property right insecurity.
percent of the bargainers captured all potential gains. When security rose to
q ¼ 0.75, efficiency fell further: R ¼ 0.754 and RR ¼ 0.782. The potential
gains were captured in 72.2 percent of bargains. At q ¼ 0.9, the mean relative
reward measure approached 0.500, and over half of the bargains left
potential gains on the table. With secure property rights (q ¼ 1.0), mean
reward and relative reward efficiency were 0.427 and 0.450, and potential
gains were captured in only 45.6 percent of the bargains.2
Table IV. Efficiency by property rights security
Efficiency measure Probability of secure property rights (q)
1.00 0.90 0.75 0.50 0.00 Total
Reward Mean 0.427 0.480 0.745 0.920 0.963 0.638
Median 0.233 0.349 0.939 0.967 0.958 0.928
S.D. 0.477 0.421 0.322 0.155 0.014 0.430
Relative reward Mean 0.450 0.502 0.782 0.952 0.988 0.663
Median 0.246 0.364 0.975 1.000 0.983 0.970
S.D. 0.502 0.441 0.334 0.160 0.014 0.447
Probability Mean 0.486 0.541 0.812 0.963 1.000 0.692
Median 0.333 0.420 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
S.D. 0.486 0.428 0.317 0.157 0.000 0.431
# of aH = 0 22 8 13 17 18 78
% of aH = 0 45.8% 44.4% 72.2% 94.4% 100.0% 65.0%
Lottery tickets captured
Total tickets (both
A&B) (180 tickets
possible)
Mean 149.2 148.3 164.4 176.7 180
Median 140 135 180 180 180
S.D. 29.2 29.6 26.2 14.1 0.0
Total tickets +
Endowment )
transaction costs
(200 tickets possible)
Mean 165.5 164.1 179.6 192.8 195.6
Median 153.5 149 194.5 196 195
S.D. 28.7 29.1 26.7 14.0 1.6
N 48 18 18 18 18 120
We address the robustness of these summary statistics by estimating the
following model:
E ¼ b0 þ bk
X5
k¼2
qk þ bin
X24
n¼2
sn þ bt
X5
t¼2
rt þ bm
X5
m¼2
lm þ e
where E represents one of the efficiency measures (R, RR), qk are dummy
variables representing property right security, sn captures individual subject
effects for players A or B (i ¼ A, B), rt captures round effects, and lm captures
lottery schedule effects. Tests reveal individual subject, round and lottery
effects were insignificant.3
Table V presents the estimates of the restricted model. The empirical
results correspond to the descriptive statistics indicating that property right
security reduces efficiency. Relative to the no property right security baseline
(q ¼ 0.0), estimated coefficients indicate efficiency decreases less than 5 per-
cent when property right security is a 50–50 prospect, approximately 20
percent when security is 75 percent probable, nearly 50 percent when security
is 90 percent probable, and over 50 percent when property when rights are
secure with certainty.
Decreased property right security increases the cost of non-cooperative
outcomes and therefore, property owners are led to the bargaining table by
the insecurity. People who had to bargain paid the transaction costs because
it was in their private interest to do so; those who could opt out avoided them
because it also was in their private interest. A property owner’s lack of
interest in bargaining is magnified by the positive transactions costs, and the
potential for those costs to erode the property owner’s initial position if the
bargain does not go well. Property owners therefore perceive the potential
Table V. Estimated coefficients for models of reward efficiency*
Variable Reward efficiency Relative reward
efficiency
Probability efficiency
b0 0.963 (0.000) 0.988 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000)
bq = 0.50 )0.043 (0.728) )0.036 (0.781) )0.037 (0.769)
bq = 0.75 )0.209 (0.094) )0.206 (0.116) )0.189 (0.136)
bq = 0.90 )0.483 (0.000) )0.486 (0.000) )0.459 (0.000)
bq = 1.00 )0.536 (0.000) )0.538 (0.000) )0.514 (0.000)
N 120 120 120
F-statistic 11.14 10.37 10.08
P-value (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
* Individual, round and lottery schedule effects were not significant. P-values are reported in
parentheses.
gains from the bargain will not compensate for the costs of bargaining. This
result corresponds to previous studies showing transaction costs decrease
efficiency in the presence of secure property rights (Rhoads and Shogren
1999), and potential gains may not suffice to induce self-interested bargaining
(Shogren 1998). And while forgoing potentially mutually advantageous
outcomes does not appear rational, the result corresponds to evidence rela-
tive outcomes matter as much as absolute outcomes.
Just as first-movers in an ultimatum game understand rejection is likely
if they offer a significant uneven split, bargainers understand mutual
advantageous, but uneven, outcomes may be difficult to achieve and
choose not to face certain costs on an uncertain outcome. And as the
security of the property right is diminished, the more attractive and less
risky cooperation is for the property owner – i.e., more gains relative to
the threat point and more evenly split outcomes that increase the likeli-
hood of agreement. We have not considered the expected private and
social gains that arise from the personal investment to improve protected
assets that arise from secure property rights. Secure property rights pro-
mote investment in capital and create sweat-equity that is an obvious gain
to society. What our results suggest is these gains would have to be worth
the costs from inefficient bargaining due to lower costs of non-cooperative
behavior.
Result 2. Mean ex ante option price is inversely related to the level of in-
creased property right security. The average option price falls considerably
short of the predicted value of a secure property rights – the average bidder
only paid 20–60 percent of the predicted valuation.
Rational choice theory suggests a person’s willingness to pay should be
inversely related to property right security – the option price to increase
security from 50 to 100 percent, WTP0.50, should exceed the option price
from 90 to 100 percent, WTP0.90. Table VI provides the descriptive statistics
for the bids by auction (WTPp where p ¼ 0.00, 0.50, 0.75, and 0.90). Six
bidders in eight auctions yielded 48 total bids – 12 bids for auctions. As
theory predicts, mean willingness to pay is inversely related to the level of
increased property right security. Tests of equality confirm the relationship is
significant. Bargainers therefore were rational with their sealed bids for
increasing the security of their property rights.
While bargainers were rational in submitting higher bids for greater
increases in security, they also were conservative relative to the predicted
option price for secure property rights. The average bidder underbid relative
to the theoretic predicted option price for all auctions. For instance, the mean
bid to go from no rights to secure rights was only about 20 percent of the
predicted option price (17.82 vs. 90 tickets). Overall, average bids ranged
from 20 to 60 percent of the theoretical value of secure property rights.
Examining the empirical value of secure property rights, we observe bar-
gainers failed to realize the predicted gains from possessing secure property
rights. Therefore the conservative nature of bidders may have been war-
ranted. Relative to the empirical value of secure property rights, subjects
overbid in the WTP0.90 and WTP0.75 auctions and underbid in the WTP0.50
and WTP0.00.
Result 3. Self-interest and Nash self-interested best organized observed bar-
gaining behavior, regardless of the property right security.
Table VII presents the distribution of wealth by Nash self-interest – the
controller captures the level predicted by the Nash solution; self-interest –
the controller at least his expected outside option; and equity – the
controller splits the tickets with the non-controller. The definitions of
self-interest and equity become blurred as property rights become less
secure. With secure rights (q ¼ 1), over 70 percent of the controllers (34 of
48) earned at least outside option – which supports the idea of rational
bargaining. A mild risk to security (q ¼ 0.9) does not change this result –
nearly 90 percent (16 of 18) of controllers were rationally self-interested.
With even more risk (q ¼ 0.75), controllers remained rational – over 70
percent (13 of 18) earned at least their outside option.
Table VI. Option prices: tests of rationally in the auction
Treatment auction Number
of bids
Option
price
mean
Option
price sd
Option
price
min–max
Predicted
option
value
Empirical
option
value
Descriptive statistics by treatment
WTP0.90 12 5.67 4.03 0–15 9.0 )0.8
WTP0.75 12 6.83 4.63 2–20 22.5 5.9
WTP0.50 12 14.08 6.36 8–21 45.0 24.2
WTP0.00 12 17.92 3.06 15–21 90.0 28.6
Combined 48 11.75 7.60 0–21
The Null t-statistic P-value Reject?
Tests of equality
Ho:WTP0.00 = WTP0.50 )1.8817 0.0366 Yes
Ho:WTP0.50 = WTP0.75 )3.1929 0.0021 Yes
Ho:WTP0.75 = WTP0.90 )0.6585 0.2585 No
The nature of the distribution of wealth changes once we consider even
odds of security risk (q ¼ 0.5) or no security (q ¼ 0.0). Now it is rational for
the controller to accept an equal split of lottery tickets. Equal splits are a
natural and rational focal point for bargainers facing risky property rights.
And in fact this is just what we observed. For even odds, over 80 percent (15
of 18) of the agreements were efficient and equitable. This was also the case
for no security – about 95 percent (17 of 18) of the bargains split tickets
equally and efficiently. We therefore cannot reject the hypothesis that our
average bargainer was rational.
5. Conclusion
Coase (1988, p. 15) explained his theorem nearly three decades later by
noting; ‘‘[w]hat my argument does suggest is the need to introduce positive
transactions costs explicitly into economic analysis so that we can study the
world that does exist.’’ Herein we see that transaction costs created an inverse
relationship between property right security and bargaining efficiency. As the
certainty of property rights increased, the degree of self-interested behavior
Table VII. Distribution of wealth
Probability of
secure property
rights
N Wealth distribution Hits (#) Rate (%)
1.00 48 Nash self-interest 4 0.083
Self-interest 30 0.625
Equal splits 6 0.125
0.90 18 Nash self-interest 3 0.167
Self-interest 13 0.722
Equal splits 2 0.111
0.75 18 Nash self-interest 2 0.111
Self-interest 11 0.611
Equal splits 4 0.277
0.50 18 Nash self-interest 0 0.000
Self-interest 3 0.167
Self-interest equal splits 15 0.833
0.00 18 Nash Self-interest equal splits 17 0.944
Total 120 Nash self-interest 26 0.217
Self-interest 98 0.817
increased – but at a cost of less efficiency. Less security actually generated
more efficient agreements. This occurred because the property right owner
found it more profitable to bargain even with transaction costs rather than
unilaterally exercise his inefficient and risky outside option. Once at the table,
bargainers capture all the potential gains from exchange. In contrast, many
property owners with secure property rights concluded the potential bar-
gaining gains were not worth the private transaction costs, and left the social
gains behind.
We recognize and appreciate secure property rights create other social
gains that go well beyond simply providing an outside option for Coasean
bargaining. Secure property rights create privacy and provide the incentive to
make new improvements to capital. Perceived threats to these broader pur-
poses that support hard work and sweat equity can affect a property owner’s
willingness to cooperate in a bargain, even if positive gains are to be had. For
instance, policy to protect endangered species on private land is moving
toward new compensation schemes that will require some form of coopera-
tive bargaining. But some landowners will reject the extra compensation if
they believe in the end their privacy will not be respected, their prior stew-
ardship efforts will not be acknowledged, and their ability to protect their
investment will be restricted. Future work on efficient Coasean bargaining in
the lab could take this broader perspective. Let bargainers choose between
private and socials gains from protecting new investments in capital that
create wealth versus the social losses that arise from the ability to avoid the
bargaining table when it is costly.
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Notes
1. For completeness, we examine whether bargainers focus on maximizing the joint odds of
winning – ignoring the magnitude of transactions costs – by considering probability effi-
ciency:
P ¼ aA þ aB  a
o
A
as
:
Though expected utility assumes people evaluate probabilities and consequences compre-
hensively, subjects dealing with choices under uncertainty frequently focus on probabilities
and neglect consequences, or visa versa. In such a case, the bargain yields outcomes with
relatively high probability efficiency and low reward efficiency.
2. An alternative measure of efficiency is the nearness to the efficient frontier. This measure
still leads to the same conclusion. For instance, we know from Table II that bargainers
start at 120 lottery tickets for secure rights, which means they have 60 tickets to bargain
over to hit the efficient frontier (ignoring the 20 ticket endowment and transaction costs for
simplicity); and they have 60 tickets for totally insecure rights, which means they have 120
tickets to bargain over to hit the frontier. From Table IV, we see bargains with secure rights
only captured 149.2 of the 180 tickets on average, which means they captured 29.2 tickets
out of the 60 (about 50 percent). In contrast, bargains with totally insecure rights captured
180 of 180 tickets on average, or 120 of the 120 available (100%). By either measure –
Reward Efficiency or nearness to the efficient frontier – insecure rights induced greater
economic efficiency.
3. Given the dependent variable is based on bargaining pairs, individual subject effects for A
and B players were estimated separately. In each case, individual effects were insignificant
(F ¼ 1.30 when i ¼ A, and F ¼ 0.93when i ¼ B). Results for round and lottery effects were
also insignificant (F ¼ 0.47 and F ¼ 0.78). Results therefore are consistent across the full
and restricted models.
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